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Abstract. We define a simple process calculus, based on Hennessy and
Regan’s Timed Process Language, for specifying networks of communicat-
ing programmable logic controllers (PLCs) enriched with monitors enforc-
ing specifications compliance. We define a synthesis algorithm that given
an uncorrupted PLC returns a monitor that enforces the correctness of
the PLC, even when injected with malware that may forge/drop actua-
tor commands and inter-controller communications. Then, we strengthen
the capabilities of our monitors by allowing the insertion of actions to
mitigate malware activities. This gives us deadlock-freedom monitoring :
malware may not drag monitored controllers into deadlock states.
Keywords: Process calculus · PLC correctness · Runtime enforcement.
1 Introduction
Industrial Control System (ICSs) are distributed systems controlling physical
processes via programmable logic controllers (PLCs) connected to sensors and
actuators. PLCs have an ad-hoc architecture to execute simple processes known
as scan cycles. Each scan cycle consists of three phases: (i) reading of the sen-
sor measurements of the physical process; (ii) derivation of the commands to
guide the evolution of the physical process; (iii) transmission of the calculated
commands to the actuator devices.
Published scan data show how thousands of PLCs are directly accessible from
the Internet [25]. When this is not the case, PLCs are often connected to each
other in field communications networks, opening the way to the spreading of
worms such as the PLC-Blaster worm [27] or the PLC PIN Control attack [2].
As a consequence, extra trusted hardware components have been proposed to
enhance the security of ICS architectures [21,23]. In this respect, McLaughlin [21]
proposed to add a policy-based enforcement mechanism to mediate the actuator
commands transmitted by the PLC to the physical plant, whereas Mohan et
al. [23] introduced an architecture in which every PLC runs under the scrutiny
of a monitor which looks for deviations with respect to safe behaviours; if the
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behaviour of the PLC is not as expected then the control passes to a safety
controller which maintains the plant within the required safety margins.
Both architectures above have been validated by means of simulation-based
techniques. However, as far as we know, formal methodologies have not been
used yet to model and formally verify security-oriented architectures for ICSs.
The goal of the paper is to verify the effectiveness of a process calculus
approach to formalise runtime enforcement of specification compliance in net-
works of PLCs injected with colluding malware that may forge/drop both actu-
ator commands and inter-controller communications3. Process calculi represent
a successful and widespread formal approach in concurrency theory relying on a
variety of behavioural equivalences (e.g., trace equivalence and bisimilarity) for
studying complex systems, such as distributed migrating objects [22], IoT sys-
tems [12,6,13] and cyber-physical systems [16], and used in many areas, includ-
ing verification of security protocols [1,18] and security analysis of cyber-physical
attacks [15]. On the other hand, runtime enforcement [26,17,8] is a powerful
verification/validation technique aiming at correcting possibly-incorrect execu-
tions of a system-under-scrutiny (SuS) via a kind of monitor that acts as a proxy
between the SuS and its environment.
Thus, we propose to synthesise a proxy from an uncorrupted PLC, to form a
monitored PLC ensuring: 1. observation-based monitoring, i.e., the proxy should
only look at the observables of the PLC, and not at its internal execution;
2. transparency, i.e., the semantics of the monitored PLC must not differ from
the semantics of the genuine (i.e., uncorrupted) PLC; 3. sound execution of the
monitored PLC, to prevent incorrect executions; 4. deadlock-freedom, i.e., an in-
jected malware may not drag a monitored PLC into a deadlock state; 5. prompt
detection of PLC misbehaviours to rise alarms addressed to system engineers
(who will reinstall an obfuscated variation of the software of the PLC).
Obviously, if the PLC is compromised then its correct execution can only be
enforced with the help of an extra component, a secured proxy, as advocated by
McLaughlin [21] and Mohan et al. [23]. This means that any implementation of
our proposed proxy should be bug-free to deal with possible infiltrations of mal-
ware. This may seem like we just moved the problem over to securing the proxy.
However, this is not the case because the proxy only needs to enforce correctness,
while the PLC controls its physical process relying on malware-prone commu-
nications via the Internet or the USB ports. Of course, by no means runtime
reconfigurations of the secure proxy should be allowed.
Contribution. We define a simple timed process calculus, based on Hennessy
and Regan’s TPL [10], for specifying networks of communicating monitored con-
trollers, possibly injected with colluding malware that may forge/drop both ac-
tuator commands and inter-controller communications. Monitors are formalised
in terms of a sub-class of finite-state Ligatti et al.’s edit automata [17]. A net-
work composed of n PLCs Ctrli, running in parallel, each of which injected with
3 We do not deal with alterations of sensor signals within a PLC, as they can already
be altered either at the network level or within the sensor devices [9].
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a malware Malwi, and enforced by a monitor Moni, is represented as:
Mon1`{Ctrl1 | Malw1} ‖ . . . ‖ Monn`{Ctrln | Malwn} .
Here, the parallel process Ctrli | Malwi is a formal abstraction of the sequential
execution of the PLC code Ctrli injected with the malware Malwi.
Then, we propose a synthesis function
q−y that, given an uncorrupted (deter-
ministic) PLC Ctrl returns, in polynomial time, a syntactically deterministic [3]
edit automaton
q
Ctrl
y
to form a monitored PLC that ensures: observation-based
monitoring, transparency, sound execution of the monitored PLC, and prompt
detection of alterations of the behaviour of the monitored PLC. These properties
can be expressed with a single algebraic equation:
n∏
i=1
q
Ctrli
y
`{Ctrli | Malwi} '
n∏
i=1
go`{Ctrli} (1)
for arbitrary malware Malwi, where ' denotes trace equivalence and go is the
monitor that allows any action. Here, intuitively, each monitor
q
Ctrli
y
prevents
incorrect executions of the compromised controller Ctrli | Malwi.
However, our monitors do not protect against malware that may drag a mon-
itored PLC into a deadlock state. In fact, Equation 1 does not hold with respect
to weak bisimilarity, which is a notoriously deadlock-sensitive semantic equiva-
lence. Thus, in order to achieve deadlock-freedom we equip our monitors with the
semantic capability to mitigate those malicious activities that may deadlock the
controller. In practice, our monitors will be able to insert actions, i.e., to emit
correct actions in full autonomy to complete scan cycles. The enforcement re-
sulting from the introduction of mitigation allows us to recover deadlock-freedom
monitoring by proving Equation 1 with respect to weak bisimilarity.
Outline. Section 2 defines our process calculus to express monitored controllers
injected with malware. Section 3 defines an algorithm to synthesise our monitors.
Section 4 introduces mitigation to recover deadlock-freedom. Section 5 draws
conclusions and discusses related work. Full proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 A timed process calculus for monitored PLCs
We define our process calculus as an extension of Hennessy and Regan’s TPL [10].
Let us start with some preliminary notation. We use s, sk ∈ Sens for sensor
signals, a, ak ∈ Act for actuator commands, and c, ck ∈ Chn for channel names.
Controller. In our setting, controllers are nondeterministic sequential timed pro-
cesses evolving through three different phases: sensing of sensor signals, com-
munication with other controllers, and actuation. For convenience, we use four
different syntactic categories to distinguish the four main states of a controller:
Ctrl for initial states, Sens for sensing states, Com for communication states,
3
Table 1. LTS for controllers
(Rec)
S{rec X.S/X} α−−→ S′
rec X.S
α−−→ S′
(TimeS)
−
tick.S
tick−−−→ S
(ReadS)
j ∈ I
b∑i∈I si.SicS sj−−−→ Sj (TimeoutS)
−
b∑i∈I si.SicS tick−−−→ S
(InC)
j ∈ I
b∑i∈I ci.CicC cj−−−→ Cj (TimeoutInC)
−
b∑i∈I ci.CicC tick−−−→ C
(OutC)
−
bc.CcC′ c−−→ C
(TimeoutOutC)
−
bc.CcC′ tick−−−→ C′
(WriteA)
−
a.A
a−−→ A
(End)
−
end.P
end−−−→ P
andAct for actuation states. In its initial state, a controller is a recursive process
starting its scan cycle in the sensing phase:
Ctrl 3 P ::= rec X.S
Notice that due to the cyclic behaviour of controllers, the process variable X may
syntactically occur only in the last phase, actuation. We assume time guarded re-
cursion to avoid undesired zeno behaviours. Intuitively, in time guarded recursion
the process variable must occur prefixed by at least one timed action tick.
During the sensing phase, the controller waits for a finite number of admis-
sible sensor signals. If none of those signals arrives in the current time slot then
the controller will timeout moving to the following time slot (we adopt the TPL
construct b·c· for timeout). The controller may also sleep for a while, waiting for
sensor signals to become stable. The syntax is the following:
Sens 3 S ::= b∑i∈I si.SicS ∣∣ tick.S ∣∣ C
Once the sensing phase is concluded, the controller starts its calculations that
may depend on communications with other controllers. Controllers communicate
to each other for mainly two reasons: either to receive notice about the state of
other physical sub-processes or to require an actuation on a different physical
process that will have an influence on the physical process governed by the
controller. We adopt a channel-based handshake point-to-point communication
paradigm. Notice that, in order to avoid starvation, the communication is always
under timeout. The syntax for the communications phase is:
Comm 3 C ::= b∑i∈I ci.CicC ∣∣ bc.CcC ∣∣ A
Thus, our controllers can either listen on a finite number of communication
channels or transmit on specific channels to pass some local information.
Finally, in the actuation phase the controller eventually transmits a finite
sequence of commands to a number of different actuators, and then, it emits a
4
Table 2. LTS for malware code
(Malware)
j ∈ I
b∑i∈I µi.MicM µj−−−→Mj (TimeoutM)
−
b∑i∈I µi.MicM tick−−−→M
(RecM)
M {rec X.M/X} α−−→M ′
rec X.M
α−−→M ′
(TimeM)
−
tick.M
tick−−−→M
(TimeNil)
−
nil
tick−−−→ nil
special signal end to denote the end of the scan cycle. After that, it restarts its
cycle in the sensing phase via a recursive call denoted with a process variable X.
In order to ensure semantics closure, we also have a construct end.P which will
be only generated at runtime but never used to write PLC programs.
Act 3 A ::= a.A ∣∣ end.X ∣∣ end.P
Remark 1 (Scan cycle duration and maximum cycle limit). Notice that any scan
cycle of a PLC must be completed within a maximum cycle limit which depends
on the controlled physical process; if this time limit is violated the PLC stops
and throws an exception [27]. Thus, the signal end must occur well before the
maximum cycle limit. We assume that our PLCs successfully complete their
scan cycle in less than half of the maximum cycle limit.
The operational semantics of controllers is given in Table 1. This is very
much along the lines of Hennessy and Regan’s TPL [10]. In the following,
we use the metavariables α and β to range over the set of possible actions:
{s, a, a, c, c, τ, tick, end}. These actions denote: sensor readings, actuator commands,
drops of actuator commands, channel transmissions, channel receptions/drops,
internal actions, passage of time, and end of a scan cycle, respectively.
Malware. Let us provide a formalisation of the malware code that we assume
may be injected in a controller to compromise its runtime behaviour. The kind
of malware we wish to deal with may perform the following malicious activities:
– forging fake channel transmissions towards other controllers (via actions c);
– dropping incoming communications from other controllers (via actions c);
– forging fake actuator commands (via actions a);
– dropping actuator commands launched by the controller (via actions a).
The formal syntax of the admitted malware is the following:
Malw 3M ::= b∑i∈I µi.MicM ∣∣ rec X.M ∣∣ X ∣∣ tick.M ∣∣ nil
where the prefixes µi ∈ {c, c, a, a}, for i ∈ I, denote the possible malicious actions
mentioned above. Again, we assume time guarded recursion to avoid undesired
zeno behaviours. A straightforward operational semantics is given in Table 2.
Compromised controller. In our setting, a compromised controller is a controller
that may potentially run in parallel with an arbitrary piece of malware. The
5
Table 3. LTS for compromised controllers
(Ctrl)
Z
α−−→ Z′ α 6= tick
Z | M α−−→ Z′ | M
(Inject)
M
α−−→ M ′ α 6∈ {tick, a}
Z | M α−−→ Z | M ′
(DropAct)
Z
a−−→ Z′ M a−−→ M ′
Z | M τ−−→ Z′ | M ′
(TimePar)
Z
tick−−−→ Z′ M tick−−−→ M ′
Z | M tick−−−→ Z′ | M ′
syntax is the following:
Z ::= P
∣∣ S ∣∣ C ∣∣ A
CCrtl 3 J ::= Z ∣∣ Z |M
where Z ∈ Ctrl ∪ Sens ∪ Comm ∪ Act denotes a controller in an arbitrary
state, and | is the standard process algebra construct for parallel composition.
The operational semantics of a compromised controller is given by the tran-
sition rules of Table 3. Rule (Ctrl) models the genuine behaviour of the controller
even in the presence of the malware (possibly waiting for a proper trigger). Rule
(Inject) denotes the injection of a malicious action fabricated by the malware.
Rule (DropAct) models the drop of an actuator command a performed by the
malware; thus, the command a never reaches its intended actuator device. Rule
(TimePar) models time synchronisation between the controller and the malware.
We recall that recursion processes in a malware are always time guarded;
thus, a malware can never inject zeno behaviours preventing the passage of time
ad infinitum in a controller.
Remark 2 (Attacks on channels). Notice that injection/drop on communication
channels affects the interaction between controllers and not within them. For this
reason, we do not have a rule for channels similar to (DropAct). Inter-controller
malicious activities on communication channels will be prevented by the monitor.
Monitored controller(s). The core of our runtime enforcement relies on a (recur-
sive) timed variant of Ligatti et al.’s edit automata [17], i.e., a particular class
of automata specifically designed to modify/suppress/insert actions in a generic
system in order to preserve its correct behaviour. Their syntax follows:
Edit 3 E ::= go ∣∣ ∑i∈I αi/βi.Ei ∣∣ rec X.E ∣∣ X
Intuitively, the automaton go will admit any action of the monitored system,
while the edit automaton
∑
i∈I αi/βi.Ei replaces actions αi with βi, and then
continues as Ei, for any i ∈ I, with I finite. The operational semantics of our
edit automata is the following:
(Go)
−
go
α/α−−−−→ go
(Edit)
j ∈ I∑
i∈I αi/βi.Ei
αj/βj−−−−−→ Ej
(recE)
E{rec X.E/X}
α/β−−−−→ E′
rec X.E
α/β−−−−→ E′
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Table 4. LTS for monitored field communications networks
(ParL)
N1
α−−→ N ′1
N1 ‖ N2 α−−→ N ′1 ‖ N2
(ParR)
N2
α−−→ N ′2
N1 ‖ N2 α−−→ N1 ‖ N ′2
(ChnSync)
N1
c−−→ N ′1 N2 c−−→ N ′2
N1 ‖ N2 τ−−→ N ′1 ‖ N ′2
(TimeSync)
N1
tick−−−→ N ′1 N2 tick−−−→ N ′2 N1 ‖ N2 τ−−→6
N1 ‖ N2 tick−−−→ N ′1 ‖ N ′2
When an edit automaton performs a transition labeled α/β, with α 6= τ and
β = τ , we say that the automaton suppresses the observable action α.
Our monitored controllers, written E`{J}, are constituted by a (potentially)
compromised controller J and an edit automaton E enforcing the behaviour of
J according to the following transition rule for correction/suppression:
(Enforce)
J
α−−→ J ′ E
α/β−−−→ E′
E`{J} β−−→ E′`{J ′}
.
In a monitored controller E`{J} with no malware inside, the enforcement never
occurs, i.e., in rule (Enforce) we always have α = β, and the two components E
and J evolve in a tethered fashion, moving through related correct states.
Obviously, we can easily generalise the concept of monitored controller to a
field communications network of parallel monitored controllers, each one acting
on different actuators, and exchanging information via channels. These networks
are formally defined via the grammar:
FNet 3 N ::= E`{J} ∣∣ N ‖ N
and described via the operational semantics given in Table 4. Notice that moni-
tored controllers may interact with each other via channel communication. More-
over, they may evolve in time when no communication occurs (we recall that
neither controllers nor malware admit zeno behaviours). This ensures us maxi-
mal progress [10], a desirable time property when modelling real-time systems:
communications are never postponed to future time slots.
Having defined the possible actions of a monitored field network, we can
easily define execution traces.
Definition 1 (Execution traces). Given a trace t = α1 . . . αk, we write N
t−−→
N ′ as an abbreviation for N = N0
α1−−−→ N1 α2−−−→ · · ·
αk−1−−−−−→ Nk−1 αk−−−→ Nk = N ′.
Execution traces can be used to formally define both notions of anomaly
detection and correction, achieved by the monitoring edit automaton. Intuitively,
the detection occurs whenever the edit automaton does not allow the execution
of a certain observable action α proposed by a compromised controller; if α is
7
replaced with a different action β then the automaton does: (i) correction, if
β 6= τ , and (ii) suppression, if β = τ .
Definition 2 (Anomaly detection and correction). Let J = P | M be a
compromised controller. We say that an edit automaton E detects an anomaly
of J during the execution of some observable action α in the trace tα, only if:
– P t−−→ Z (t is a genuine trace of P );
– J tα−−−→ J ′, for some J ′;
– E`{J} t−−→ N , for some N (E does allow the trace t), and E`{J} tα−−−→ N ,
for no N (E does not allow tα).
We say that E corrects ( resp., suppresses) the observable action α of the trace
tα of J only if E ` {J} tβ−−−→ N ′, for some action β, with τ 6= β 6= α ( resp.,
β = τ). If P tα−−−→ Z, for some Z, then we say that there is a false positive when
trying the execution of α.
Behavioural equalities. In the paper, we adopt standard behavioural equivalences
between (networks of) monitored controllers. In particular, we use trace equiva-
lence, written ', weak similarity, denoted v, and weak bisimilarity, written ≈.
2.1 Use case: a small water-tank system
In this section, we specify the controller of a simple water-tank system depicted
in Figure 1. Basically, in this system the water is pumped into the tank via a
pump. Furthermore, a valve connects the tank with an external unit which is
not represented. Here, we assume that the incoming water flow is lower than the
out-coming flow passing through the valve.
The PLC works as follows: it waits for one time slot (to get stable sensor
signals) and then checks the water level of the tank, distinguishing between
three possible states. If the tank reaches a low level (signal l) then the pump is
turned on (command on) and the valve gets closed (command close). If the level of
the tank is high (signal h) then the PLC listens for requests arriving at channel
open_req to open the valve; if the PLC gets a request then it opens the valve
(command open) and returns; otherwise, it timeouts and then turns the pump off
(commands off) and closes the valve (command close). Finally, if the tank is at
some intermediate level between l and h (signal m) the PLC listens for requests
of water; if it gets a request of water (via the channel open_req) then it turns the
pump on and opens the valve, letting the water flow out; otherwise, if it receives
a request to close the valve (via the channel close_req) then it closes the valve,
and then returns.
The specification of the controller PLC mentioned above is the following:
rec X.
(
tick.bl.on.close.end.X +h.bopen_req.open.end.Xc(off.close.end.X)c(end.X)
+m.bopen_req.on.open.end.X+ close_req.close.end.Xc(end.X)).
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Fig. 1. A simple water-tank system
3 Synthesis of monitoring proxies
In Table 5, we provide a synthesis function
q−y that given a controller P ∈ Ctrl
returns a syntactically deterministic edit automaton E ∈ Edit enforcing the
correct behaviour of P , independently of the presence of an arbitrary malware
M ∈ Malw that attempts to inject and/or drop both actuator commands and
channel communications.
In the definition of our synthesis, we adopt the following standard notation
for co-actions regarding actuator commands and channel communications: Act ,
{a | a ∈ Act} and Chn , {c | c ∈ Chn}. Furthermore, we define Act∗ , Act∪Act
and Chn∗ , Chn ∪ Chn.
Let us comment on the details of the synthesis function
q−y of Table 5.
The edit automaton associated to listening on sensor signals allows all incoming
signals expected by the controller, together with the passage of time due to even-
tual timeouts. All other actions are suppressed. The edit automaton associated to
the listening on communication channels is similar, except that communications
that are not admitted by the controller are suppressed to prevent both drops and
injections on system channels, as well as, covert communications between collud-
ing malware running in different PLCs. Channel transmissions are allowed only
when occurring, in the right order, on those channels intended by the controller;
all other actions are suppressed. Only genuine actuator commands (again, in the
right order) are allowed. Drops of actuator commands, the only possible intra-
controller interaction occurring between the genuine controller and the malware,
are allowed because we want an observation-based monitoring. Finally, the mon-
itoring edit automaton and the associated controller do synchronise at the end of
each controller cycle via the action end: all other actions emitted by the compro-
mised controller are suppressed, included those actions coming from the genuine
controller that was left behind in its execution due to some injection attack mim-
icking (part of) some correct behaviour. We recall that only the construct end.X
(and not end.P ) is used to write PLC programs.
Let us start with two easy observations.
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Table 5. The synthesis algorithm
q−yq
rec X.S
y
, rec X.
q
S
yqb∑i∈I si.SicSy , rec Y.(∑i∈I si/si.qSiy+ tick/tick.qSy+ ∑
α∈Act∗∪Chn∗
α/τ .Y
)
q
tick.S
y
, rec Y.
(
tick/tick.
q
S
y
+
∑
α∈Act∗∪Chn∗
α/τ .Y
)
qb∑i∈I ci.CicCy , rec Y.(∑i∈I ci/ci.qCiy+ tick/tick.qCy+ ∑
α∈Act∗
α/τ .Y +
∑
γ∈Chn∗\∪i∈I{ci}
γ/τ .Y
)
qbc.C1cC2y , rec Y.(c/c.qC1y+ tick/tick.qC2y+ ∑
α∈Act∗
α/τ .Y +
∑
γ∈Chn∗\{c}
γ/τ .Y
)
q
a.A
y
, rec Y.
(
a/a.
q
A
y
+ τ/τ .Y +
∑
α∈Act∗\{a,a}
α/τ .Y +
∑
γ∈Chn∗
γ/τ .Y
)
q
end.X
y
, rec Y.
(
end/end.X+
∑
α∈Act∗∪Chn∗
α/τ .Y
)
Remark 3 (Observation-based monitoring). Our monitoring is observation-based
as the edit automata resulting from our synthesis never correct τ -actions (i.e.,
non-observable actions).
Remark 4 (Colluding malicious activities). Any inter-controller activity which
does not comply with the genuine behaviour of the PLC under scrutiny is sup-
pressed by the enforcement.
The synthesis proposed in Table 5 is suitable for implementation.
Proposition 1 (Determinism preservation). Let P ∈ Ctrl be a determinis-
tic controller. The automaton
q
P
y
is syntactically deterministic in the sense of [3].
Furthermore, our synthesis algorithm is computationally feasible. The complex-
ity of the synthesis is quadratic on the dimension of the controller, where, intu-
itively, the dimension of a controller P ∈ Ctrl, written dim(P ), is given by the
number of prefixes α ∈ Act ∪ Chn∗ ∪ Sens ∪ {tick, end} occurring in it (its formal
definition can be found in the appendix).
Proposition 2 (Polynomial complexity). Let P ∈ Ctrl be a deterministic
controller, the complexity to synthesise
q
P
y
is O(n2), with n = dim(P ).
As required at the beginning of this section, the synthesised edit automata
are always transparent, i.e., they never introduce non-genuine behaviours.
Proposition 3 (Transparency). If P ∈ Ctrl then qPy`{P} ≈ go`{P}.
Furthermore, our enforcement enjoys soundness preservation: in a monitored
controller, a malware may never trigger an incorrect behaviour.
Proposition 4 (Soundness). Let P be an arbitrary controller and M be an
arbitrary malware. Then,
q
P
y`{P |M} v qPy`{P}.
In the next proposition, we provide a result that is somehow complementary
to Proposition 4. The intuition being that in a monitored controller
q
P
y`{P |
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M} the controller P may execute all its (genuine) execution traces even in the
presence of an arbitrary malware M . Said in other words, the controller P has a
chance to follow (and complete) its correct execution, even when compromised
by the presence of a malware M .
Proposition 5. Let P be an arbitrary controller and M be an arbitrary mal-
ware. Then,
q
P
y`{P |M} w qPy`{P}.
By applications of Propositions 3, 4, and 5 we can summarise our enforcement
in a single equation.
Theorem 1 (Weak enforcement). Let P ∈ Ctrl be an arbitrary controller
and M ∈Malw be an arbitrary malware. Then, qPy`{P |M} ' go`{P} .
An easy consequence of weak enforcement is the absence of false negatives.
Corollary 1 (Correct detection). Let P be an arbitrary controller, M be an
arbitrary malware, J = P |M , and t be a genuine trace of P ( i.e., P t−−→ Z, for
some Z). If J
tα−−−→ J ′, for some α and J ′, but P tα−−−→ Z for no Z, then qPy
promptly detects an anomaly of J when trying the execution of α in the trace tα.
Furthermore, weak enforcement scales to field communications networks of
communicating controllers compromised by the presence of colluding malware.
Proposition 6 (Weak enforcement of field networks). Let Pi ∈ Ctrl and
Mi ∈Malw, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then,
∏n
i=1
q
Pi
y`{Pi |Mi} ' ∏ni=1 go`{Pi} .
However, our enforcement does not enjoy deadlock-freedom.
Remark 5 (Injection attacks may prevent deadlock-freedom). In a monitored con-
troller of the form
q
P
y ` {P | M}, it may well happen that the malware
M misleads the edit automaton
q
P
y
by injecting an untimed trace M
α1−−−→
. . .
αn−−−→ M ′ of actions, with αi 6= tick, compatible with the correct behaviour
of the controller, in the sense that the very same trace may be executed by
P : P
α1−−−→ . . . αn−−−→ Q, for some state Q. This would give rise to the fol-
lowing admissible execution trace for the monitored controller:
q
P
y ` {P |
M} α1−−−→ . . . αn−−−→ qQy ` {P | M ′}, in which the actual controller P re-
mains inactive. At that point, if the malware M ′ stops following an admissible
runtime behaviour for the controller, the edit automaton
q
Q
y
will suppress all
possible actions, even those proposed by P , which was left behind in its ex-
ecution. Thus, the monitored controller will continue its evolution as follows:q
Q
y ` {P | M ′} τ−−→ . . . τ−−→ qQy ` {P ′ | M ′′}. In this case, as neither the
controller nor the malware can give rise to zeno behaviours, the enforced system
may eventually reach a deadlock state in which (i) P ′ = end.X, (ii)M ′′ = tick.M ′′′,
for some M ′′′, or M ′′ = nil, and (iii)
q
Q
y
does not allow end-actions because it
requires some actions (e.g., actuations) to be performed before ending the con-
troller cycle.
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Notice that Remark 5 is not in contradiction with Proposition 5 because in that
proposition we proved that a controller has a chance to follow and complete
its correct behaviour in the presence of an arbitrary malware. Here, we say a
different thing: a malware has a chance to deadlock our monitored controllers.
4 Mitigation: the recipe for deadlock-freedom
In this section, we introduce an extra transition rule for monitored controllers
to implement mitigation, i.e., the insertion of a sequence of activities driven
by the edit automaton in full autonomy, when the controller has lost contact
with its enforcer:
(Mitigation)
J
end−−−→ J ′ E
α/α−−−→ E′ α ∈ Chn∗ ∪ Act ∪ {tick}
E`{J} α−−→ E′`{J}
Intuitively, if the compromised controller signals the end of the scan cycle by
emitting the action end and, at the same time, the current edit automaton E is
not in the same state, then E will command the execution of a safe trace, without
any involvement of the controller, to reach the end of the controller cycle. When
both the controller and the edit automaton will be aligned (at the end of the
cycle) they will synchronise on the action end, via an application of the transition
rule (Enforce), and from then on they will continue in a tethered fashion.
Notice that in a monitored controller E`{J} where J is corrupted by some
malware, the two components E and J may get misaligned as they may reach
unrelated states. For instance, in case of drop of actuator commands the cor-
rupted controller J may reach an incorrect state, leaving behind its monitoring
edit automata E. In this case, the remaining observable actions in the current cy-
cle of the compromised controller will be suppressed until the controller reaches
the end of the scan cycle, signalled by the emission of an end-action (notice that
since our malware are time-guarded they cannot introduce zeno behaviours to
prevent a controller to reach the end of its scan cycle). Once the compromised
controller has been driven to the end of its cycle, the transition rule (Mitigation)
goes into action.
Remark 6. The assumption made in Remark 1 ensures us enough time to com-
plete the mitigation of the scan cycle, well before the maximum cycle limit.
As a main result, we prove that with the introduction of the rule (Mitigation)
our runtime enforcement for controllers works faithfully up to weak bisimilarity,
ensuring deadlock-freedom.
Theorem 2 (Strong enforcement). Let P ∈ Ctrl be an arbitrary controller
and M ∈Malw be an arbitrary malware. Then, qPy`{P |M} ≈ go`{P} .
A consequence of Theorem 2 is the prompt detection and correction of alter-
ations of PLC behaviours in case of injected malware.
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Corollary 2 (Detection and mitigation). Let P ∈ Ctrl be an arbitrary
controller, M ∈ Malw be an arbitrary malware, and J = P | M the derived
compromised controller.
1. If J tα−−−→ J ′ for some genuine trace t of P ( i.e., P t−−→ Z, for some Z), for
some observable action α, but P tα−−−→ Z for no Z, then the monitor
q
P
y
detects an anomaly of J when trying the execution of the incorrect action α
of the trace tα.
2. Whenever
q
P
y
detects an anomaly α in J , it mitigates the anomaly either
by correcting the action α with an action β, τ 6= β 6= α, or by suppress-
ing the action α.
As for weak enforcement, strong enforcement scales to field networks of com-
municating controllers compromised by the presence of (potentially) colluding
malware.
Corollary 3 (Strong enforcement of field networks). Let Pi ∈ Ctrl and
Mi ∈Malw, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then,
∏n
i=1
q
Pi
y`{Pi |Mi} ≈ ∏ni=1 go`{Pi} .
5 Conclusions and related work
We have defined a formal language to express networks of monitored PLCs,
potentially compromised with colluding malware that may forge/drop actuator
commands and inter-controller communications. We do not deal with alterations
of sensor signals within a PLC, as they can already be altered either at the
network level or within the sensor devices [9].
The runtime enforcement has been achieved via a finite-state sub-class of
Ligatti’s edit automata equipped with an ad-hoc operational semantics to deal
with system mitigation, by inserting actions in full autonomy when the monitored
controller is not able to do so in a correct manner.
Then, we have provided a synthesis algorithm that, given a deterministic
uncorrupted controller, returns, in polynomial time, a syntactically determinis-
tic edit automata to enforce the correctness of the controller. The proposed en-
forcement meets a number of requirements: observation-based monitoring, trans-
parency, , soundness, and deadlock-freedom, and prompt detection of alterations
of the behaviour of the monitored PLC in case of injected malware.
Related work. The notion of runtime enforcement was introduced by Schnei-
der [26] to enforce security policies. These properties are enforced by means of
security automata, a kind of automata that terminates the monitored system in
case of violation of the property. Ligatti et al. [17] extended Schneider’s work
by proposing the notion of edit automaton, i.e., an enforcement mechanism able
of replacing, suppressing, or even inserting system actions. In general, Ligatti et
al.’s edit automata have an enumerable number of states, whereas in the cur-
rent paper we restrict ourselves to finite-state edit automata. Furthermore, in
its original definition the insertion of actions is possible at any moment, whereas
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our monitoring edit automata can insert actions, via the rule (Mitigation), only
when the PLC under scrutiny reaches a specific state, i.e., the end of the scan
cycle. Finally, our actions of the form α/β can be easily expressed in the original
formulation by inserting the action β and then suppressing the action α. Unlike
Schneider and Ligatti et al., we do not enforce specific properties for all admissi-
ble systems (in our case, controllers) but we ensure the preservation of the correct
semantics of a corrupted controller. Bielova [5] provided a stronger notion of en-
forceability by introducing a predictability criterion to prevent monitors from
transforming invalid executions in an arbitrary manner. Falcone et al. [7,8] pro-
posed a synthesis algorithm, relying on Street automata, to translate most of the
property classes defined within the Safety-Progress hierarchy [19] into enforcers.
Könighofer et al. [11] proposed a synthesis algorithm that given a safety property
returns a monitor, called shield, that analyses outputs of reactive systems. More
recently, Pinisetty et al. [24] have proposed a bi-directional runtime enforcement
mechanism for reactive systems, and more generally for cyber-physical systems,
to correct both inputs and outputs. Aceto et al. [4] developed an operational
framework to enforce properties in HML logic with recursion (µHML) relying on
suppression. They also enforced the safety of the syntactic fragment of the logic
by providing an automated synthesis function that generates correct suppression
monitors from formulas. Enforceability of modal µ-calculus (a reformulation of
µHML) was previously tackled by Martinelli and Matteucci [20]. Finally, in our
companion paper [14] we have abstracted over PLC implementations and pro-
vided a simple language of regular properties to express correctness properties
that should be enforced upon completion of PLC scan cycles.
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A Proofs
Before proving Proposition 2 we provide a formal definition of the size of a
controller.
Definition 3. For a generic controller Z, we define the size of Z, written dim(Z),
by induction on the structure of the controller:
dim(rec X.S) , dim(S) dim(b∑i∈I si.SicS) , | I | +∑i∈I dim(Si) + dim(S)
dim(tick.S) , 1 + dim(S) dim(b∑i∈I ci.CicC) , | I | +∑i∈I dim(Ci) + dim(C)
dim(a.A) , 1 + dim(A) dim(bc.C1cC2) , 1 + dim(C1) + dim(C2)
dim(end.X) , 1 .
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Let us prove Proposition 2.
Proof. For a generic controller Z, we prove that the recursive structure of the
synthesis function
q
Z ′
y
with Z ′ ∈ {P, S,C,A} can be characterised by the fol-
lowing form: T (m) = T (m − 1) + n , with n = dim(Z) and dim(Z ′) = m ≤ n .
Hence the thesis follows since T (n) = T (n − 1) + n is O(n2). We prove this by
case analysis on the structure of Z by examining each synthesis step in which
the synthesis function is processing m = dim(Z ′) symbols, whit m ≤ n and
Z ′ ∈ {P, S,C,A}. Thus, we characterise: (i) how many symbols of Z the syn-
thesis functions processes, (ii) how many times the synthesis function calls itself
and (iii) how many computations performs in that step. We consider the most
significant cases.
Case b∑i∈I ci.CicC. For m = dim(b∑i∈I ci.CicC), by definition the synthe-
sis function consumes all ci, with i ∈ I. The synthesis function calls itself again
r + 1 times where r =| I |. Thus, each qCiy operates on kik (m − r) remaining
symbols and also
q
C
y
operates on kr+1k (m − r) remaining symbols, for some
finite k such that
∑r+1
i=1 ki = k. The synthesis function produces a sum over
α ∈ Act∗ ∪ Chn∗ \⋃i∈I ci which are at most n operations. Thus, we can charac-
terise the recursive structure as: T (m) =
∑r+1
i=1 T (
ki
k (m−r))+n. The complexity
of the this recursive form is smaller than the complexity of T (m− 1) + n.
Case a.A. For m = dim(a.A), by definition the synthesis function consumes
the, a and calls itself again once
q
A
y
Moreover, the synthesis function produces
a sum over α ∈ Act∗ ∪Chn∗ ∪ {τ} \ {a, a} which are at most n operations. Thus
we can characterise the recursive structure as: T (m) = T (m− 1) + n.
Let us prove Proposition 4 (Soundness).
Proof. Let us define four binary relations:
– P , {(qPy`{J}, qPy`{P}) | for any P and J};
– S , {(qSy`{J}, qSy`{S}) | for any S and J};
– C , {(qCy`{J}, qCy`{C}) | for any C and J};
– A , {(qAy`{J}, qAy`{A}) | for any A and J}.
We prove that the relation R , P ∪ S ∪ C ∪ A is a weak simulation. For each
pair (N1, N2) ∈ R we proceed by case analysis on why N1 α−−→ N ′1. We consider
the most significant cases.
Case (N1, N2) ∈ C. We do case analysis on the structure of the controller C in
N1 =
q
C
y`{J}, for some arbitrary J .
Let C ≡ b∑i ci.CicCˆ.
– Let N1
ci−−→ qCiy`{J ′} = N ′1, by an application rule (Enforce) as J ci−−→ J ′.
Then, N2 =
q
C
y ` {C} ci−−→ qCiy ` {Ci} = N ′2 and (N ′1, N ′2) ∈ C ⊂ R by
construction.
– Let N1
tick−−−→ qCˆy`{J ′} = N ′1, by an application rule (Enforce) as J tick−−−→
J ′. Then, N2 =
q
C
y` {C} tick−−−→ qCˆy` {Cˆ} = N ′2 and (N ′1, N ′2) ∈ C ⊂ R
by construction.
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– Let N1
τ−−→ qCy ` {J ′} = N ′1, by an application rule (Enforce), because
J
α−−→ J ′, for some α ∈ Act∗ ∪ Chn∗ \ ⋃i ci. Here, notice that the edit au-
tomaton
q
C
y
suppresses all possible injections originating from the malware,
turning them into τ -actions. Thus, N2 =
q
C
y`{C} τˆ==⇒ qCy`{C} = N ′2
and (N ′1, N ′2) ∈ C ⊂ R by construction.
Let C ≡ bc.C1cC2. This case is similar to the previous one.
Let C ≡ A. In this case, we end up to the case (N1, N2) ∈ A.
Case (N1, N2) ∈ A. We do case analysis on the structure of the controller A in
N1 =
q
A
y`{J}, for some arbitrary J .
Let A ≡ a.Aˆ.
– Let N1
a−−→ qAˆy ` {J ′} = N ′1, by an application of (Enforce) as J a−−→ J ′
Then, Aˆ = A and N2 =
q
A
y ` {A} a−−→ qAy ` {A} = N ′2 and (N ′1, N ′2) ∈
A ⊂ R by construction.
– Let N1
τ−−→ qAˆy ` {J ′} = N ′1, by an application rule (Enforce), because
J
α−−→ J ′, for some α ∈ {τ}∪Act∗∪Chn∗\{a}. Note that the edit automatonq
A
y
suppresses all possible injections originating from the malware, turning
them into τ -actions. Thus, N2 =
q
Aˆ
y ` {Aˆ} τˆ==⇒ qAˆy ` {Aˆ} = N ′2 and
(N ′1, N
′
2) ∈ A ⊂ R by construction.
Let A ≡ end.X.
– Let N1
end−−−→ qSy ` {J ′} = N ′, by an application rule (Enforce) triggered
by (Ctrl). By definition of the transition rule (Rec) we end up from end.X
to the case end.S. Then, N2 =
q
A
y ` {A} end−−−→ qSy ` {S} = N ′2 and
(N ′1, N
′
2) ∈ S ⊂ R by construction.
– Let N1
τ−−→ qAy ` {J ′} = N ′1, by an application rule (Enforce) triggered
by an application of rule (Inject) or (Ctrl), because J
α−−→ J ′ for some α ∈
{a, a, c, c}. Here, notice that the edit automaton qSy suppresses all possible
injections originating from the malware or the controller not aligned with
the edit, turning them into τ -actions. Thus, N2 =
q
A
y ` {A} τˆ==⇒ qAy `
{A} = N ′2 and (N1, N ′2) ∈ A ⊂ R by construction.
Let us prove Proposition 5.
Proof. Let us define fours binary relations:
– P , {(qPy`{P}, qPy`{P |M}) | for any P and M};
– S , {(qSy`{S}, qSy`{S |M}) | for any S and M};
– C , {(qCy`{C}, qCy`{C |M}) | for any C and M};
– A , {(qAy`{A}, qAy`{A |M}) | for any A and M}.
It is enough to prove that the relation R , P∪S∪C∪A is a weak simulation. For
each pair (N1, N2) ∈ R, the proof proceeds by case analysis on why N1 α−−→ N ′1.
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The proofs relies on two main facts: (i) in a compromised controller Z | M the
malware M cannot prevent the execution of actions that Z would execute in
isolation, in particular, (ii) M cannot prevent the passage of the time of Z, as
recursion processes in M are always time guarded.
Let us prove Corollary 1 (Correct detection)
Proof. As P
t−−→ Z, for some Z, by an application of transition rules (Go) and
(Enforce) it follows that go ` {P} t−−→ go ` {Z}. By an application of the
implication from right to left of Theorem 1 it follows that
q
P
y`{P |M} t−−→ N ,
for some N . Thus, by Definition 2, we have to show that
q
P
y`{P |M} tα−−−→ N
for no N . However, if P
tα−−−→ Z for no Z, then go ` {P} t·α−−−→ N , for no N .
Thus, by an application of Theorem 1, this time from left to right, it follows thatq
P
y`{P |M} tα−−−→ N , for no N , as required.
Let us prove Proposition 6 (Weak enforcement of field networks).
Proof. The result cannot be directly derived by an application of Theorem 1
because in our timed setting trace equivalence ' is not preserved by paral-
lel composition (the problem being the negative premise in the transition rule
(TimeSync)). However, since the weak simulation v is notoriously preserved by
parallel composition, by an application of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 we
can easily derive:
n∏
i=1
q
Pi
y`{Pi |Mi} v n∏
i=1
go`{Pi} .
Furthermore, by an application of Proposition 3 and Proposition 5 we can derive:
n∏
i=1
q
Pi
y`{Pi |Mi} w n∏
i=1
go`{Pi} .
This is enough to derive that the two systems under investigation are trace
equivalent.
Let us prove Theorem 2 (Strong enforcement of controllers).
Proof. Let us define four binary relations:
– S , {(qSy`{S |M}, qSy`{S}) | for any S and M};
– S , {(qSy`{J}, qSy`{S}) | for any S and M};
– C , {(qCy`{J}, qCy`{C}) | for any C and J};
– A , {(qAy`{J}, qAy`{A}) | for any A and J}.
We prove that the relation R , P ∪ S ∪ C ∪ A is a weak bisimulation.
For each pair (N1, N2) ∈ R we proceed by case analysis on why N1 α−−→ N ′1.
Then, we do the same for N2
α−−→ N ′2. We consider the most significant cases.
Case (N1, N2) ∈ C. We do case analysis on the structure of the controller C in
N1 =
q
C
y`{J}, for some arbitrary J .
Let C ≡ b∑i ci.CicCˆ.
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– Let N1
ci−−→ qCiy`{J ′} = N ′, by an application rule (Enforce) triggered by
(Ctrl) or (Inject), alternatively, by an application of rule (Mitigation). Then,
N2 =
q
C
y ` {C} ci−−→ qCiy ` {Ci} = N ′2 and (N ′1, N ′2) ∈ C ⊂ R by
construction.
– Let N1
tick−−−→ qCˆy ` {J ′} = N ′, by an application rule (Enforce) triggered
by an application of rule (TimeSync), alternatively, by an application of rule
(Mitigation). Then, N2 =
q
C
y`{C} tick−−−→ qCˆy`{Cˆ} = N ′2 and (N ′1, N ′2) ∈
C ⊂ R by construction.
– Let N1
τ−−→ qCy ` {J ′} = N ′1, by an application rule (Enforce) triggered
by an application of rule (Inject) or (Ctrl), because J
α−−→ J ′ for some α ∈
Act∗∪Chn∗\⋃i ci. Note that the edit automaton qCy suppresses all possible
injections originating from the malware or the controller not aligned with
the edit automaton, turning them into τ -actions. Note also that if J
a−−→ J ′,
for some actuator name a, then no drop is actually possible. Thus, N2 =q
C
y`{C} τˆ==⇒ qCy`{C} = N ′2 and (N1, N ′2) ∈ C ⊂ R by construction.
Now, we proceed by case analysis on why N2
α−−→ N ′2.
– Let N2 =
q
C
y`{C} ci−−→ qCiy`{Ci} = N ′2. Then, by definition of qCy we
have
q
C
y ci/ci−−−−→ qCiy by an application of rule (Enforce) because J ci−−→ J ′,
it follows that N1
ci−−→ qCiy ` {J ′} = N ′1, and (N ′1, N ′2) ∈ C ⊂ R by
construction. Note that, if J
end−−−→, then by an application rule (Mitigation),
it follows that N1
ci−−→ qCiy ` {J} = N ′1, and (N ′1, N ′2) ∈ C ⊂ R by
construction.
– Let N2 =
q
C
y`{C} tick−−−→ qCˆy`{Cˆ} = N ′2. Then, by definition of qCy we
have
q
C
y tick/tick−−−−−→ qCˆy and qCy α/τ−−−→ qCy, for any action α ∈ Act∗ ∪Chn∗ \⋃
i ci performed (injected) by the malware or the controller not aligned with
the edit automaton. We recall that recursion in both malware and controller
code is always time-guarded, i.e. may not prevent the passage time. More
formally, for any J there is a finite n providing an upper bound to the
maximum number of possible consecutive untimed actions of J . Thus, by
n possible applications of rule (Inject) or (Ctrl) and a final application of
rule (TimeSync), we have: J α1−−−→ J1 α2−−−→ · · · αn−−−→ Jn tick−−−→ J ′. By n +
1 applications of rule (Enforce) we get N1
tick
===⇒ qCˆy ` {J ′} = N ′1, with
(N ′1, N
′
2) ∈ C ⊂ R by construction.
Let C ≡ bc.C1cC2. This case is similar to the previous one.
Let C ≡ A. In this case, we resort to one of the next cases.
Case (N1, N2) ∈ A. We proceed by case analysis on the structure of the con-
troller A in N1 =
q
A
y`{J}, for some arbitrary J .
Let A ≡ a.Aˆ.
– Let N1
a−−→ qAˆy`{J ′} = N ′, by an application rule (Enforce) triggered by
(Ctrl) or (Inject), alternatively, by an application of rule (Mitigation). Then,
19
N2 =
q
A
y`{A} a−−→ qAˆy`{Aˆ} = N ′2 and (N ′1, N ′2) ∈ A ⊂ R by construc-
tion.
– Let N1
τ−−→ qAy ` {J ′} = N ′1, by an application of (Enforce) triggered by
an application of (Inject) or (Ctrl), because J
α−−→ J ′ for some α ∈ {τ} ∪
Act∗ ∪Chn∗ \ {a}. Note that the edit automaton qAy suppresses all possible
injections originating from the malware or the controller not aligned with the
edit automaton, turning them into τ -actions. Furthermore, the misalignment
may also occur as the malware has dropped the current actuation (DropAct),
thus the controller performing an actuation α ∈ Act∪\{a} will be suppressed.
Thus, N2 =
q
A
y ` {A} τˆ==⇒ qAy ` {A} = N ′2 and (N1, N ′2) ∈ A ⊂ R by
construction.
Now, we proceed by case analysis on why N2
α−−→ N ′2.
– Let N2 =
q
A
y ` {A} a−−→ qAˆy ` {Aˆ} = N ′2. Then, by definition of qAy
we have
q
A
y a/a−−−→ qAˆy by an application of rule (Enforce) because J a−−→
J ′, it follows that N1
a−−→ qAˆy ` {J ′} = N ′1, and (N ′1, N ′2) ∈ A ⊂ R by
construction. Note that, if J
end−−−→ by an application of rule (Mitigation),
it follows that N1
a−−→ qAˆy ` {J} = N ′1, and (N ′1, N ′2) ∈ As ⊂ R by
construction.
Let A ≡ end.X.
– Let N1
end−−−→ qSy`{J ′} = N ′, by an application rule (Enforce) triggered by
(Ctrl). Note that by definition of the transition rule (Rec) we end up from
end.X to the case end.S. Then, N2 =
q
A
y` {A} end−−−→ qSy` {S} = N ′2 and
(N ′1, N
′
2) ∈ S ⊂ R by construction.
– Let N1
τ−−→ qAy ` {J ′} = N ′1, by an application rule (Enforce) triggered
by an application of rule (Inject) or (Ctrl), because J
α−−→ J ′ for some α ∈
Act∗∪Chn∗. Here, notice that the edit automaton qAy suppresses all possible
injections originating from the malware or the controller not aligned with
the edit, turning them into τ -actions. Thus, N2 =
q
A
y ` {A} τˆ==⇒ qAy `
{A} = N ′2 and (N1, N ′2) ∈ A ⊂ R by construction.
Now, we proceed by case analysis on why N2
α−−→ N ′2.
– Let N2 =
q
A
y`{A} end−−−→ qSy`{S} = N ′2. Here notice that by definition
of the transition rule (Rec) we end up from end.X to the case end.S. Then,
by definition of
q
A
y
we have
q
A
y end/end−−−−→ qSy and qAy α/τ−−−→ qAy, for any
action α ∈ Act∗∪Chn∗ performed (injected) by the malware or the controller
not aligned with the edit. Recall that the recursion in both malware and
controller code is always time-guarded, i.e.may not prevent the passage time.
Thus, the controller can always perform end. More formally, for any J there
is a finite integer n providing an upper bound to the maximum number of
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possible consecutive untimed actions of J . Thus, by n possible applications
of rule (Inject) or (Ctrl) and a final application of rule (Enforce), we have:
J
α1−−−→ J1 α2−−−→ · · · αn−−−→ Jn end−−−→ J ′. By n + 1 applications of rule (Enforce)
we get N1
end
===⇒ qSy`{J ′} = N ′1, with (N ′1, N ′2) ∈ S ⊂ R by construction.
Before proving Corollary 2 we need the following technical result, saying that
controllers never deadlock.
Lemma 1. For any closed Z, it holds that Z
β−−→ Zˆ, for some β and Zˆ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of Z.
– If Z ≡ rec X.S then, by definition of the transition rule (Rec), we end up to
the other cases.
– If Z ≡ b∑i si.SicSˆ then we can apply two different transitions rules:
• by an application of rule (ReadS) we have Zˆ sj−−−→ Sj , for some j ∈ I;
• by an application of rule (TimeoutS) we have Zˆ tick−−−→ S.
In both cases, we have b∑i si.SicSˆ β−−→ Zˆ, for some β and Zˆ.
– The other cases can be proved in a similar manner since Z is closed and so
Z 6= end.X.
Let us prove Corollary 2 (Detection and mitigation).
Proof. Let us prove the first item. As P
t−−→ Z, for some Z, by an application
of transition rules (Go) and (Enforce) it follows that go`{P} t−−→ go`{Z}. By
an application of the implication from right to left of Theorem 2 it follows thatq
P
y ` {P | M} t−−→ N , for some N . Thus, by Definition 2, we have to show
that
q
P
y ` {P | M} tα−−−→ N for no N . However, if P tα−−−→ Z for no Z, then
go ` {P} t·α−−−→ N , for no N . Thus, by an application of Theorem 2, this time
from left to right, it follows that
q
P
y`{P |M} tα−−−→ N , for no N , as required.
Let us prove the second item. Let us prove by contradiction that
q
P
y ` {P |
M} tβ−−−→ N for some β 6= α. Suppose qPy`{P | M} tβ−−−→ N , for no β and N .
By an application Theorem 2, from right to left, it follows that go`{P} tβ−−−→ N ,
for no β and N . Thus, P
tβ−−−→ Z, for no β and Z. Since, by hypothesis, P t−−→ Z,
for some Z, it holds that Z
β−−→ Zˆ, for no β and Zˆ. This is in contradiction with
Lemma 1. Hence we have that
q
P
y`{P | M} tβ−−−→ N for some β 6= α. We are
ready now to prove the thesis:
– β is derived by an application of rule (Mitigation) and hence α = end andq
P
y β/β−−−→. By definition of the synthesis function, we have that τ 6= β 6=
α = end.
– β is derived by an application of rule (Enforce) and hence, by definition of the
synthesis function,
q
P
y
suppresses the action α, namely, α 6= τ and β = τ .
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